

# RCMP fentanyl-superlab communications and potential policy consequences

Five-page supplementary analysis for complaint intake. This document narrows the issue, identifies what the public record does and does not establish, and proposes records that could test the complaint.

## 1. Purpose and complaint framing

The complaint concerns the accuracy, qualification, approval and later correction of RCMP public communications about Canadian fentanyl production, alleged international distribution and the October 2024 Falkland, British Columbia drug laboratory. I used the phrase **economic sabotage** as a research label for a hypothesis about possible institutional recklessness or misleading communication. I am **not** asking the Commission to presume intentional sabotage, criminal guilt, conspiracy or a proven causal link to tariffs.

The narrower and testable question is whether identifiable RCMP members made or approved materially misleading statements, blurred important distinctions, failed to communicate known limitations, or failed to correct a public impression after those statements acquired major policy significance. If the evidence instead shows that the statements fairly reflected the information available at the time, that should be documented as well.

### Why the issue warrants review

- On 31 October 2024, the RCMP described the Falkland operation as Canada's largest and most sophisticated fentanyl and methamphetamine superlab. It reported 54 kg of fentanyl, large quantities of precursors and a possible yield of more than 95.5 million potentially lethal doses.
- That release referred broadly to domestic production and international distribution. Yet its specific export example concerned 310 kg of methamphetamine. A Government of Canada briefing note later stated there was no evidence the suspect had or intended to ship the substances to the United States and little to no law-enforcement evidence that Canadian-produced fentanyl was an increasing U.S. threat.
- U.S. Executive Order 14193 later imposed duties on Canadian goods while expressly referring to alleged fentanyl synthesis labs in Canada and to Canadian reporting about domestic production. This proves a policy connection between the fentanyl narrative and tariffs; it does not by itself prove that the RCMP caused the U.S. decision.

### Analytical safeguards

This submission keeps five distinctions separate: (1) drug seizure versus proof of on-site synthesis; (2) mixing, cutting or pressing versus chemical synthesis of fentanyl; (3) equipment or precursor capability versus completed production; (4) methamphetamine export evidence versus fentanyl export evidence; and (5) allegations or charges versus findings proved in court.

**A dose-equivalent estimate is a public-health communication device, not a measurement of product actually manufactured or destined for a particular market. Likewise, low cross-border seizure volumes do not prove zero trafficking, and the absence of an immediate price change would not prove an operation was fictitious. These are reasons to obtain the underlying records, not reasons to pre-judge them.**

## 2. What the public record establishes - and what remains open

The following comparison is based on official publications. It treats operational statements as allegations pending forensic and court records.

| Public statement                                                                                                                                                                   | What it supports                                                                                    | Material limitation or open question                                                                                                                                  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| RCMP, 31 Oct. 2024: 54 kg fentanyl, precursors, 390 kg methamphetamine and other drugs seized at Falkland-related sites.                                                           | A major multi-drug seizure and a site with significant illicit-drug capability.                     | The release does not publish purity, precursor identities, synthesis route, batch records or a forensic allocation of equipment between fentanyl and methamphetamine. |
| RCMP: combined fentanyl and precursors could have amounted to more than 95.5 million potentially lethal doses.                                                                     | A high-end counterfactual risk estimate based on seized fentanyl plus assumed precursor conversion. | The calculation method, dose threshold, theoretical yield, expected losses and amount of precursor actually convertible to fentanyl were not stated.                  |
| RCMP: investigation concerned mass production and distribution across Canada and internationally.                                                                                  | Investigators had an international organized-crime hypothesis.                                      | The release's concrete export seizure was methamphetamine. It did not identify a fentanyl shipment, U.S. customer or fentanyl-specific export route.                  |
| Government briefing note: little to no evidence Canadian-produced fentanyl was an increasing U.S. threat; no evidence the Falkland suspect intended to ship substances to the U.S. | Officials distinguished domestic production from a demonstrated U.S.-export threat.                 | A briefing note is not a forensic report and does not rule out all international trafficking.                                                                         |
| RCMP, 10 Apr. 2025: specialized equipment at other B.C. sites could synthesize fentanyl; two sites suspected of production.                                                        | Later investigations provided more explicit indicators of possible synthesis capability.            | The RCMP also said there was no evidence in those cases or others that the labs were producing fentanyl for U.S. export; processing was ongoing.                      |

### The decisive evidence

- Forensic chemistry: purity and form of the 54 kg; exact precursors and quantities; validated synthesis pathway; reaction vessels, residues, waste products and completed batches.
- Export evidence separated by drug: destination, communications, shipping preparations and whether any evidence concerned fentanyl rather than methamphetamine.
- Communications evidence: drafts, legal and scientific review, approval chain, media questions, correction discussions and briefings to Canadian or U.S. officials

**Without those records, the public can reasonably identify an inconsistency or ambiguity, but cannot responsibly conclude that the lab was staged, that no fentanyl synthesis occurred, or that any RCMP member intentionally lied.**

### 3. Trade-policy significance and limits of causal inference

The economic component of the complaint is not that a single press release can be proven, from public material alone, to have caused tariffs. The concern is that high-impact Canadian law-enforcement claims may have become part of an international policy narrative whose consequences were substantial, making accuracy and correction especially important.

#### Documented policy linkage

- Executive Order 14193, published in the U.S. Federal Register on 7 February 2025, declared an emergency and imposed additional duties on Canadian products. It referred to a claimed growing presence of fentanyl and nitazene synthesis labs in Canada, cited FINTRAC reporting, and expressly tied the duties to illicit drugs across the northern border.
- The order imposed 25 percent additional duties generally and 10 percent on energy or energy resources, subject to later amendments and exemptions. This establishes that fentanyl allegations formed part of the stated legal and policy rationale.
- Canada's Fentanyl Czar page reports that, from 2022 through 2025 year-to-date, almost 71,000 lb of fentanyl were seized in southern-border areas and approximately 134 lb in northern-border areas - about one tenth of one percent at the northern border.

Those numbers do not identify the origin of every seized gram and do not negate the lethality of fentanyl. They do show why proportionality, terminology and source attribution matter. A small measured cross-border share can coexist with a serious domestic production problem, but the two should not be rhetorically merged.

#### What FINTRAC material can and cannot prove

FINTRAC's January 2025 Operational Alert was designed to help reporting entities recognize financial transactions associated with synthetic-opioid trafficking and production. It was built from financial intelligence disclosures, transactions, publications and law-enforcement reporting. It is an intelligence-indicator document, not a judicial finding about a specific laboratory or export route. FINTRAC's later 2024-25 annual report stated that the alert did not identify trafficking of fentanyl from Canada to the United States.

#### Causal questions for records, not assumption

- What Canadian operational claims, images, briefings or intelligence were provided to U.S. agencies before February 2025?
- Did U.S. decision-makers rely on the Falkland characterization, other RCMP cases, FINTRAC language, classified intelligence, or independent sources?
- Were Canadian officials aware that fentanyl-production claims were being used to support tariffs, and did they consider a factual clarification distinguishing domestic risk from proven U.S. export?
- Did any later forensic result materially narrow or contradict the original public impression, and if so, what correction process applied?

**The evidentiary chain must be proved step by step: RCMP knowledge and wording; dissemination; actual reliance by policy actors; tariff design and implementation; and measurable economic loss. The websites [economicsabotage.ca](http://economicsabotage.ca) and [fentanylepidermic.ca](http://fentanylepidermic.ca) organize the hypothesis and sources, but they are not independent proof of any link in that chain.**

## 4. Information sources, prior contacts and responses

This section answers the Commission's intake questions directly and distinguishes records I located in email from matters recalled but not independently documented there.

### Question 1 - Where the information came from

- Primary public records: RCMP news releases and statements; Government of Canada briefing material; Public Safety, Privy Council Office and FINTRAC publications; the U.S. Executive Order and Federal Register; and available prosecution or court information.
- Secondary reporting was used mainly to find leads and questions. Where possible, I returned to the underlying official record before relying on a claim.
- ChatGPT-assisted research was used to locate, compare, summarize and organize material. ChatGPT is not an evidentiary source and may make mistakes; any proposition should be checked against the linked underlying record.
- I created economicsabotage.ca to present the economic-harm hypothesis and fentanyl-epidemic.ca as an evolving evidence deck and source map. These are research products, not independent verification.

### Questions 2 and 3 - RCMP/police contacts and response

- On 15 June 2026, I emailed the Toronto Police Service Corporate Communications office, identified economicsabotage.ca and fentanyl-epidemic.ca, and invited guidance or correction about accuracy and the use of drug-price evidence. I located no substantive reply.
- On 26 June 2026, I sent VPD a detailed request to create a file, preserve records and identify or refer the proper independent route for concerns about RCMP/CBSA public communications. The letter expressly said I was not asking VPD to accept my conclusions. I located no substantive merits response to that request.
- On 1 July 2026, I emailed a ChatGPT research link titled 'Police Corruption Analysis' to the VPD Chief, CBC, family members and RCMP member Crystal Shostak. I located no response from the RCMP on the fentanyl-superlab or economic-harm issue.
- I also recall raising related concerns through a public-facing North Vancouver RCMP page. I have not independently verified that post from the email record, so I present it as my recollection rather than a documented formal complaint.

### Question 4 - Documentation

This five-page analysis is the supporting document submitted within the Commission's requested page limit. I can provide the underlying emails, a dated source registry, archived copies of public records and a fuller Evidence Deck if the Commission identifies what is relevant and how it should be submitted. The public index is available at [fentanyl-epidemic.ca](https://fentanyl-epidemic.ca).

**My present answer is therefore: I did contact or copy an RCMP member and attempted to raise the concern through police channels, but I am not aware of a substantive RCMP response addressing the superlab evidence, the export distinction or the economic-policy concern.**

## 5. Requested review and primary-source register

### Requested lines of inquiry

- Identify the RCMP members responsible for drafting, scientifically reviewing, approving and delivering the 31 October 2024 Falkland release and associated media statements.
- Obtain the forensic chemistry and operational records needed to distinguish seized finished fentanyl, intermediate material, precursor capability, cutting/pressing activity and proven synthesis.
- Determine the exact evidentiary basis and calculation for the 95.5-million-dose statement, including assumptions about dose, purity, conversion yield and production loss.
- Separate all evidence of fentanyl export, intended export and international distribution from the explicitly described methamphetamine shipments.
- Review internal and intergovernmental communications from October 2024 through the tariff period, including contacts with RCMP leadership, CBSA, Public Safety Canada, PCO, FINTRAC, Global Affairs, Finance, DEA, DHS and other U.S. agencies.
- Determine whether later forensic, intelligence or prosecution developments required a correction or clarification, and whether any member knowingly or recklessly approved a materially misleading public statement.
- If the matter is outside the Commission's mandate, preserve the submission and identify the appropriate independent referral route rather than treating the absence of public proof as proof that no review is warranted.

### Primary-source register

1. **RCMP, 31 Oct. 2024** - Federal investigators take down the largest, most sophisticated drug superlab in Canada.
2. **Government of Canada Question Period Note** - Fentanyl Production in Canada; distinguishes domestic production from evidence of U.S. export.
3. **RCMP, 10 Apr. 2025** - Numerous B.C. fentanyl production labs dismantled; states no evidence of production for U.S. export.
4. **U.S. Federal Register, 7 Feb. 2025** - Executive Order 14193, Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs Across Our Northern Border.
5. **Privy Council Office** - Canada's Fentanyl Czar, including northern- and southern-border seizure figures.
6. **FINTRAC, 23 Jan. 2025** - Operational Alert: Laundering the proceeds of illicit synthetic opioids.
7. **FINTRAC 2024-25 Annual Report** - later clarification that the alert did not identify Canada-to-U.S. fentanyl trafficking.

### Submission standard

**I invite correction of any factual error. My request is for evidence-based civilian review, not a declaration of guilt. The appropriate outcome should follow the underlying forensic, communications and decision records. If the statements were accurate and properly qualified, the review can establish that; if they were materially misleading or left uncorrected after their limitations became known, the Commission can determine the responsible conduct and remedy.**

# **CRCC File 2026-5070 / R2026-005289**

## **Supplementary Submission, Public-Safety Record, Chronology and Oversight References**

**Prepared from the material submitted to the CRCC and publicly available government/CRCC records.**

This compilation distinguishes allegations and questions submitted for review from established findings. Nothing in this package establishes intentional deception, conspiracy, economic sabotage, or improper interference with the complaint process.

### **Contents**

1. Original five-page supporting analysis (reproduced first in this PDF)
2. September 22 supplementary CBC/public-communications analysis
3. Public Safety Canada Question Period Note dated December 10, 2024
4. Complaint chronology through September 22, 2026
5. RCMP complaint-termination framework and documented examples
6. September 22, 2026 CRCC closure letter

## 2. September 22 supplementary CBC/public-communications analysis

The September 22 reconsideration request asked the Commission to review the CBC News / Canada Tonight video published October 31, 2024, titled *RCMP say they have busted 'largest, most sophisticated drug superlab in Canada'*, as evidence of how the RCMP operational claims were communicated nationally.

The submission did **not** offer the CBC video as proof that the RCMP statements were false or that the seizure was fabricated. It asked the Commission to compare the public statements with the forensic and investigative information available to the responsible RCMP members when the statements were drafted, approved and communicated.

### Questions identified in the supplementary submission:

- whether the 54 kg described as fentanyl was finished fentanyl, a mixture, or material of a particular purity;
- whether fentanyl was chemically synthesized at the Falkland site rather than brought there in finished or partly finished form;
- which seized precursor chemicals were specifically attributable to fentanyl synthesis;
- whether reaction intermediates, residues, waste products, batch records, or other forensic chemistry demonstrated completed fentanyl synthesis at the site;
- how much of the 95.5-million-dose calculation came from seized finished fentanyl versus assumed conversion of precursor chemicals;
- what dose threshold, purity, yield, conversion efficiency and production-loss assumptions were used; and
- whether fentanyl-specific evidence showed intended export to the United States.

The submission acknowledged that the public record strongly supports a major multi-drug laboratory and trafficking operation, while arguing that this does not by itself establish every stronger inference drawn from the announcement.

CBC video referenced in the submission: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Vn2ZN7snqw>

### 3. Public Safety Canada record - December 10, 2024

#### Question Period Note: Fentanyl Production in Canada

Reference: PS-2024-QP-1--MPS-001

Organization: Public Safety Canada

Date received: December 10, 2024

The note records the government's position that there was evidence of domestic fentanyl production in Canada, but stated that Canadian and U.S. law enforcement had **little to no evidence** that Canadian-produced fentanyl was an increasing threat to the United States.

Its background section describes the October 25, 2024 Falkland operation and lists seizures including 54 kg of fentanyl, precursor chemicals, 390 kg of methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA, cannabis, firearms, explosives and cash. It separately states that investigators became aware of large shipments destined for international export and seized 310 kg of methamphetamine before it left Canada.

The same background states that there was no evidence suggesting that the suspect had, or intended, to ship the substances to the United States. This is why the note was submitted as a potentially important qualification to broader public impressions about Canadian fentanyl export.

Official source: [Government of Canada - Question Period Note](#)

## 4. Chronology of CRCC File 2026-5070 / R2026-005289

| Date               | Event                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           |
|--------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| July 1, 2026       | CRCC received the public complaint concerning RCMP public communications about fentanyl superlabs and their possible economic and policy consequences.                                                                                          |
| August 13, 2026    | CRCC requested four categories of additional information: sources; whether the RCMP had been contacted; the RCMP response; and supporting documentation. The initial requested response date was August 20.                                     |
| August 27, 2026    | CRCC followed up, stating it had not heard back and warning that the file could be closed if no response was received by September 3.                                                                                                           |
| August 29, 2026    | Response sent to complaints@crcc-ccetp.gc.ca. It expressly asked that R2026-005289 remain open, answered all four questions, and attached the five-page CRCC_R2026-005289_Fentanyl_Superlab_Analysis.pdf.                                       |
| September 3, 2026  | Deadline identified in CRCC's August 27 follow-up.                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| September 22, 2026 | CRCC issued a letter closing File 2026-5070, stating that it had tried to obtain more information but had not received a response and therefore could not confirm jurisdiction.                                                                 |
| September 22, 2026 | The August 29 response was forwarded again to CRCC with the five-page attachment. The reconsideration request added jurisdictional clarification, the CBC analysis, the Public Safety Canada contrast, and requested reopening/reconsideration. |
| September 22, 2026 | A separate email clarified that [REDACTED] and Greatscott@draintheswamp.ca belong to the same complainant and asked that both be associated with the same complaint file.                                                                       |

**Record discrepancy:** the August 29 sent record documents a response before the September 3 deadline, while the September 22 closure letter states that no response was received. The available records establish that discrepancy but do not establish why it occurred.

## 5. RCMP termination of public-complaint investigations

The CRCC is an independent civilian oversight body, but under the statutory complaint system most accepted public complaints are sent to the RCMP for initial investigation. The RCMP Act permits the RCMP, on specified grounds, to direct that an investigation not be commenced or be terminated. A complainant may then seek independent CRCC review.

**This is distinct from the September 22 closure in this file.** The September 22 letter was issued by the CRCC at intake because it said it lacked enough information to determine jurisdiction; the current record does not show that the RCMP directed that closure.

**Current scale.** The CRCC's 2024-25 report records 311 complaints terminated by the RCMP. In 2023-24 it records 383. These figures demonstrate that RCMP termination is a regular statutory disposition, not a hypothetical mechanism.

**Historical review.** The Commission's 2009 Review of the Record Project reported that 5% of public complaints, representing 173 allegations, were terminated by the RCMP. It described the 'not necessary or reasonably practicable' ground as the most commonly used termination basis and noted that termination decisions could be reviewed by the Commission.

### Examples / official links

- [CRCC - Review of the Record Project 2009](#)
- [CRCC - Division reports documenting Notices of Direction / terminations](#)
- [CRCC - Report on RCMP Public Complaints 2024-2025](#)
- [CRCC/RCMP Memorandum of Understanding - RCMP refusal or termination notices](#)
- [CRCC - Complaint and Review Process](#)

The archived Commission review also cautioned that termination grounds were not always applied in accordance with the Act and policy, and that reasons were not always sufficiently clear to complainants. That historical finding should not be treated as evidence that any particular current termination is improper.

## **6. September 22, 2026 closure letter**

The original CRCC closure letter is reproduced as the final page of this package.

It states that the Commission could not process the complaint because it was unclear whether it related to a person or incident within its jurisdiction; that it had tried to obtain additional information but had not received a response; and that the file was therefore closed. It also states that the complainant may contact the CRCC and provide the required details if he still wishes to proceed.

Compilation note: The original July 1 complaint form itself is not reproduced here because it was not available as a standalone source file in the materials retrieved for this compilation. The original five-page supporting analysis submitted August 29 is reproduced in full.



Ottawa, Canada K1P 0B3

September 22, 2026

File Number: 2026-5070

Reference Number: R2026-005289

[REDACTED]

Via email: [REDACTED]

Scott Gilbert:

The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP (CRCC) reviewed your complaint dated July 1, 2026. Unfortunately, we cannot process your complaint for the following reason:

It is not clear to us whether your complaint relates to a person or incident within our jurisdiction.

We tried to contact you to request more information so we could clarify the matter, but we did not receive a response. Without this information, we cannot confirm whether your complaint is within our jurisdiction, so we are closing your file.

If you still wish to move forward with your complaint, please contact the CRCC and provide the required details. Please note that a one-year time limit from the date of the incident generally applies.

You may contact our Complaint Intake Office at:

Mail: Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP  
Complaint Intake Office  
P.O. Box 1722, Station B  
Ottawa, ON K1P 0B3

Online: [Contact Form \(https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/commission/contact-us/contact-us-form\)](https://www.crcc-ccetp.gc.ca/en/commission/contact-us/contact-us-form)

Fax: 613-952-8045

Your file is now closed.

Kind regards,

The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP